Trend News Agency asked Gábor Regős, Chief Economist at Gránit Asset Management, about MOL Group’s planned acquisition of a majority stake in Naftna Industrija Srbije, better known as NIS, and its broader implications for regional energy markets. Below is the edited full version of his written commentary.
MOL Group has announced that it has successfully concluded negotiations with the Serbian government on a shareholders’ agreement related to the planned acquisition of a majority stake in NIS. The transaction is not yet final: negotiations with the seller and the relevant authorities are still ongoing, and the deal remains subject to the required approvals, including from the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.
The planned acquisition is closely linked to the sanctions environment around NIS. The company came under U.S. sanctions because of its Russian ownership structure, creating pressure for a change in ownership that would allow the company to maintain stable operations and reduce sanctions-related risks. MOL had previously signed a binding Heads of Agreement with Gazprom Neft on the acquisition of the Russian-held majority stake.
Under the framework discussed with Serbia, the Serbian state would also increase its ownership if the sale receives the necessary approvals. This would strengthen Belgrade’s influence over strategic decisions, while MOL would take on a controlling operational role. The Serbian government has also sought guarantees regarding the continued operation of the Pančevo refinery, Serbia’s only oil refinery.
Currently, NIS is majority-owned by Russian interests, with Gazprom Neft and Gazprom together holding a controlling stake. The Serbian state owns close to 30 percent, while the remaining shares are held by minority investors. The planned transaction would therefore represent a significant ownership restructuring of one of Serbia’s most important energy companies.
According to Gábor Regős, the planned acquisition fits well into MOL’s long-term regional expansion strategy.
“First of all, it is worth starting with MOL as a regional player and with the characteristics of the regional energy market. Countries in the region are generally poor in natural resources, and their oil and gas supply largely depends on imports. At the same time, MOL also carries out upstream activities, including exploration and production, not only in the region but also internationally, for example in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan,” he said.
MOL’s regional presence has already been substantial. In addition to Hungary, the group has refining operations in Slovakia and Croatia, while its retail networks, either under its own brand or through subsidiaries, are present in several countries across Central and Southeastern Europe. This makes MOL one of the region’s most important integrated energy players.
“In this industry, competitiveness requires scale and cross-border operations. The planned acquisition of a majority stake in NIS therefore fits naturally into MOL’s expansion strategy,” Regős said.
A strategic asset in Serbia’s energy market
NIS is an unavoidable player in the Serbian oil market. It operates the country’s only refinery, located in Pančevo, and supplies a large part of the domestic fuel market. The company also has a major role in wholesale fuel trade, a sizeable retail network and activities in several neighboring countries. In recent years, NIS has also expanded into electricity generation.
Its importance extends beyond the energy sector. NIS is a major employer, a significant contributor to the Serbian state budget and one of the country’s most strategically important companies. This explains why the Serbian government has insisted on a stronger role in the company’s future governance and on guarantees regarding the refinery’s continued operation.
Regős noted that the ownership change would primarily address the sanctions-related vulnerability of NIS.
“The key change is the decoupling from Russian ownership. As a result, NIS would become part of a Central European value chain, significantly reducing its exposure to sanctions risks because the company would be linked to an EU-based operator,” he explained.
At the same time, the transaction would not mean a simple privatization story. The Serbian state would also increase its influence, including through additional rights in strategic decision-making. In this sense, the deal combines private-sector operational control with stronger state involvement in a strategic national asset.
Can the NIS transaction become a regional model?
According to Regős, the transaction may serve as a model in some respects, but it should not be seen as universally replicable.
“It demonstrates how ownership-related sanctions risks can be addressed through restructuring, how Russian owners can be encouraged to exit, and how continuity of operations can be protected. It is also an example of how the state can increase its influence in a company even after an earlier privatization,” he said.
The key question is whether similar situations elsewhere would also have a player like MOL: a regional company with sufficient financial strength, operational experience and strategic interest to step in.
In the broader regional energy market, Russian presence is usually not primarily a matter of ownership. In most cases, the more important issue is supply dependence, especially in crude oil and natural gas. Historical infrastructure, geography and existing transport routes have made Russian energy carriers the most likely source of supply for many countries in the region.
Recent geopolitical developments have not made diversification easier. The Middle East remains volatile, global energy markets are more sensitive to supply shocks, and landlocked Central European countries still face structural constraints in replacing traditional sources of crude oil and gas.
There is also a form of technological dependence. In several countries, refining systems and parts of the energy infrastructure were historically built around Russian feedstock, technology or supply routes. Moving away from this setup requires investment, time and technical adaptation.
“Transitioning away from this structure entails significant costs, although such adjustments are already underway to some extent,” Regős added.
Why Pančevo matters
One of the most sensitive questions in the transaction is the future operation of the Pančevo refinery. Regős does not see the assumption of operations as a major short-term challenge for MOL.
“There is a clear and ongoing need for fuel, and producing fuel requires refining crude oil. Demand for the refinery’s output will therefore remain. Since MOL already operates several refineries in the region, this activity is not new to the company,” he said.
From a Serbian political and economic perspective, however, it is understandable that the government is seeking guarantees. Serbia does not have another refinery, and the capacities of other refineries in the region would not be sufficient to fully replace Pančevo’s output.
In the longer term, the main risks are linked to crude supply, sanctions and investment needs. Refining requires stable access to suitable crude oil, and the transaction would reduce sanctions-related ownership risks but would not eliminate all supply-side vulnerabilities. Different refineries are optimized for different crude grades, so the availability and sanction status of suitable crude types will remain an important issue.
Over a longer horizon, MOL may also need to optimize production across its wider refinery network. This could become especially relevant if fuel demand declines over time due to the spread of electric vehicles and broader energy-transition trends.
“The most significant risk may arise if the refinery requires major investment that proves too costly to justify economically,” Regős concluded.
The planned NIS acquisition therefore goes beyond a single corporate transaction. It illustrates the strategic reshaping of Central and Southeastern Europe’s energy infrastructure in a sanctions-constrained environment. For MOL, it would strengthen regional scale and downstream integration. For Serbia, it could preserve the operation of a critical national energy asset while reducing exposure to Russian ownership. For the region, it offers a possible example of how energy security, sanctions policy and corporate strategy can intersect in the post-Russian energy order.
The article was first published by Trend News Agency.
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